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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, VICTIMISATION UNDER EQUALITY LAW 
AND ITS ‘ON-OFF’ RELATIONSHIP WITH CONTEMPT OF COURT 
 
Michael Connolly* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Lord Steyn once stated that the victimisation of those who complain of discrimination under 
the equality legislation should be treated as seriously as the discrimination itself. Empirical 
research, demonstrating the fear of reprisals, supports this. If, say, employees can be denied 
promotions, grievance processes, transfers, or references because of a complaint, their careers 
could be frozen for years, or even destroyed. This would undermine the legislation’s principal 
rubrics against discrimination and harassment. Hence, the equality legislation has provided an 
independent cause of action for victimisation. Yet, from the earliest days of this legislation 
(beginning with the Sex Discrimination Act 1975), the courts have afforded the victimisation 
provisions a particularly narrow construction. In 1993,  it was suggested that the resulting 
‘weak’ victimisation provisions could be ‘supplemented’ with the law of (criminal) contempt 
of court, by filling the gaps left by the narrow interpretations and moreover, providing a 
stronger ‘deterrent value’ of criminal proceedings. 
 
This paper explores that suggestion by reviewing the subsequent case law. It begins by setting 
out the legislation and the problematic ‘narrow’ interpretations. This is followed by an outline 
of the relevant principles of contempt of court, and then reviews some prominent victimisation 
cases. This review shows that indeed principles of contempt have been imported into some of 
these cases, but not in the way anticipated. It reveals that first, contempt was used to restrict 
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the victimisation provisions, second, it was ignored to fill obvious gaps in these provisions, and 
third, that some victimisation cases ought to have been referred for contempt, but were not. It 
concludes by identifying that this ‘on-off’ relationship between victimisation and contempt of 
court exposes the judiciary’s reluctance to take the administration of justice as seriously for 
equality law as it does for other fields.  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Research over the years has shown that fear of victimisation is a major deterrent to complaining 
of discrimination.1 Hence, Lord Steyn has asserted that the victimisation of those who complain 
of discrimination under the equality legislation should be treated as seriously as discrimination 
itself.2 If employees can be denied promotions, grievance processes, transfers, or references 
because of a complaint, their careers could be frozen for years, or even destroyed. This would 
undermine the legislation’s principal rubrics against discrimination and harassment. As such, 
the equality legislation, dating back to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, has provided an 
independent cause of action for Victimisation. Yet, from these earliest days, the courts have 
given the victimisation provisions a particularly narrow construction. In 1993,  Miller and Ellis 
suggested that the resulting ‘weak’ victimisation provisions could be ‘supplemented’ with 
                                                          
1 See e.g. J Gregory, Victimisation is Discrimination (1990) 20 EOR 23; EHRC, ‘Section 20 investigation into the 
Metropolitan Police Service’ <  
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-work/news/investigation-met-police-reveals-significant-
weaknesses-handling-discrimination > accessed 15 September 2016. 
2 Nagarajan v LRT [2001] AC 502 (HL), [79]. 
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(criminal) contempt of court, by filling the gaps left by the narrow interpretations and 
moreover, providing a stronger ‘deterrent value’3 of criminal proceedings. 
 
The notion is not implausible. As Bingham LJ observed in Cornelius v University College of 
Swansea, the victimisation provisions had an ‘obvious although partial analogy to the law of 
contempt’.4 The weakness of Miller and Ellis’ proposition is that it relies on the same judiciary 
to resort to another field of law to undermine their own restrictive decisions. But this is not to 
say that they have ignored contempt of court when deciding cases of victimisation. This paper 
argues that the courts have indeed imported principles of contempt, but not in the way 
anticipated.  
 
The paper begins by setting out the legislation and the problematic ‘narrow’ interpretations. 
This is followed by an outline of the relevant principles of contempt of court, and then reviews 
some prominent victimisation cases. This review shows that indeed principles of contempt have 
been imported into some of these cases, but not in the way anticipated. 
 
This paper begins with an outline of the relevant principles of  contempt of court, and then 
revisits some prominent victimisation cases to show first, how contempt was used to restrict 
victimisation, second, how it was ignored to fill obvious gaps in the victimisation provisions, 
and third, that some victimisation cases ought to have been referred for contempt. It concludes 
by identifying this ‘on-off’ relationship between victimisation and contempt of court exposes 
                                                          
3 [1993] PL 80, 87. The article citied ‘problem’ cases: Kirby v Manpower Services Commission [1980] ICR 420 
(EAT), Aziz v Trinity Street Taxis [1989] QB 463 (CA), and Cornelius v University College of Swansea, [1987] 
IRLR 141 (CA). 
4 [1987] IRLR 141, 145. See also Slade LJ in Aziz v Trinity Taxis Ltd. [1989] 1 QB 463, 484; and Buxton LJ, in 
Rhys-Harper v Relaxion [2001] ICR 1176 (CA) [38], reversed [2003] UKHL 33 (HL). 
  
 
4 
 
the judiciary’s reluctance to take the administration of justice as seriously for equality law as 
it does elsewhere. 
 
1 The Legislation and Early Cases 
 
Most cases under consideration here were heard before the Equality Act 2010 came into force, 
with its revised definition of victimisation, more of which will be discussed further below. The 
first discrimination statutes to carry victimisation provisions were the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975, followed shortly by the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA 1976). Both definitions were 
substantially the same. For instance, RRA 1976, section 2 provided:  
 
(1) A person (‘the discriminator’) discriminates against another person (‘the person 
victimised’) in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act 
if he treats the person victimised less favourably than in those circumstances he treats 
or would treat other persons, and does so by reason that the person victimised has— 
 
(a) brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under this Act; or 
(b) given evidence or information in connection with proceedings brought by any 
person against the discriminator or any other person under this Act; or 
(c) otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act ..., or 
(d) alleged that the discriminator or any other person has committed an act which 
(whether or not the allegation so states) would amount to a contravention of this Act ... 
 
Paragraphs (a) to (d) are known generally as ‘protected acts’. Like other discrimination or 
harassment, victimisation was outlawed only for certain activities, such as employment. Thus, 
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RRA 1976, section 4(2), outlawed discrimination (which included victimisation)5 by 
employers: 
 
It is unlawful for a person, in the case of a person employed by him at an establishment 
in Great Britain, to discriminate against that employee — 
(a) in the terms of the employment which he affords him; or 
(b) in the way he affords him access to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training, 
or to any other benefits, facilities or services, or by refusing or deliberately omitting to 
afford him access to them; or 
(c) by dismissing him, or subjecting him to any other detriment.6 
 
So, for employment cases, the elements for liability appeared to be: (1) the victim did a 
protected act; (2) the employer treated the victim less favourably in the terms of employment, 
or access to opportunities etc; (3) it did so ‘by reason that’ the victim did the protected act.  
 
Miller and Ellis identified three cases in particular for criticism. The first problem arose in 
Kirby v Manpower Services Commission.7 Here, an employee at a job centre was moved to less 
desirable work because he disclosed confidential information regarding suspected 
discrimination by some employers. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) rejected his claim 
of victimisation because any person disclosing confidential information of any nature would 
have been moved to other work. Thus, the EAT held that that treatment was not less favourable. 
The Court of Appeal in Aziz v Trinity Street Taxis8 overruled Kirby and held that the 
comparison should not include any element of the protected act. But any hopes that this was a 
                                                          
5 Note that RRA 1976, s 2 (above) defined victimisation as a form of discrimination. 
6 SDA 1975, 6 was substantially the same. 
7  [1980] ICR 420, (EAT). 
8  [1989] QB 463 (CA). 
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more liberal judgment were undermined when the Court went on to hold that the third limb ‘by 
reason that’, incorporated an element of conscious motive.9 Finally, in Cornelius v University 
College of Swansea,10 the Court of Appeal held that the protected act of having ‘brought 
proceedings’, did not to apply to a person merely maintaining them. 
 
 
2 Criminal Contempt of Court 
 
Criminal contempt is punishable by a fine and a maximum of two years’ imprisonment.11 It is 
traditionally a common law offence, although nowadays it is also an offence under a number 
of statutory provisions,12 most notably the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which placed strict 
liability publication contempt on to a statutory footing.13 
 
Contempt of court is universal in nature, and can be applied to new and novel situations without 
apparently widening its scope.14 Hence, there are many varieties of contempt of court. The 
analogous one here is the offence of conduct interfering with the administration of justice, and 
in particular this means conduct deterring persons from participating in the legal process. As 
such, the goal of the victimisation provisions, the parallels become apparent. Given the vast, 
perhaps infinite, variety of scenarios that could amount to interfering with the administration 
of justice, it is difficult to pin down the law to anything more than a few general principles.  
 
                                                          
9 Ibid, 485. 
10 [1987] IRLR 141 (CA). 
11 See Contempt of Court Act 1981, s 14(1), limiting imprisonment to two years for both criminal and civil 
contempt: DPP v B [2012] 1 WLR 3170 (CA), [21]. 
12 See Law Commission, Contempt of Court (Consultation Paper No 209, 2012) Appendix F, p 6, listing 27 
statutory offences, and over 50 examples of statutory provisions stating that particular conduct should be treated 
as if it were a contempt of court. 
13 In response to Sunday Times v United Kingdom (A/30) (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245. (The ‘Thalidomide case’.) 
14 Att-Gen v Newspaper Publishing Plc [1988] Ch 333 (CA), 368 (Sir John Donaldson MR). 
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For parties to the action, private pressure might be justified in a ‘common interest that fair, 
reasonable and moderate personal representations would be appropriate.’15 But if the conduct 
is public, the courts are more sensitive, and will not permit: 
 
...conduct which was calculated so to abuse or pillory a party to litigation or to subject 
him to such obloquy as to shame or dissuade him from obtaining the adjudication of a 
court to which he was entitled.16 
 
When deciding if the conduct in question amounted to contempt, ‘a court should consider [the 
facts] in the light of all the surrounding circumstances .... [including] the nature of any pending 
litigation and the stage it had reached’.17 
 
The courts are concerned principally with the effect of the conduct, no matter the intent. It is 
unsurprising to find that that where intent is required, it need not be the sole reason for the 
offending conduct.18 Hence, a newspaper publishing in defiance of a court order can be in 
contempt even though its principal intention was to enhance its circulation.19 Similarly, 
otherwise lawful conduct can amount to contempt if it interferes with the administration of 
justice. In Rowden v Universities Co-operative Association,20 a witness was suspended and 
instructed to dismiss his son from the same employer, for having given evidence against their 
                                                          
15 Att-Gen v Times Newspapers [1974] AC 273 (HL) 318-319. 
16 Ibid, 302 (Lord Morris). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Att-Gen v Newspaper Publishing [1988] Ch 333 (CA) 375 (Sir John Donaldson MR), 383 (Lloyd LJ); Att-Gen 
v Times Newspapers (Thalidomide) [1974] AC 273 (HL) 296, 299 (Lord Reid). 
19 Att-Gen v Newspaper Publishing (Spycatcher) [1989] 1 FSR 457 (Ch), 486. 
20 (1881) 71 LT Jo 373 (Ch); 1 Law Cent 161 (Hein Online: Law-Central, Vol. 1, pp. 129-184 (1881)). 
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employer. The employer was held in contempt, despite (at the time21) its otherwise lawful right 
to dismiss workers for any reason or no reason: there is no ‘greater exercise of power for 
intimidating witnesses’ than furnished in this case; it was a ‘gross contempt of Court’.22  
 
A deterrent principle also underpins the law of contempt. This is foremost in after-the-event 
cases, where the conduct, coming later, could not have affected the proceedings in question. 
Rowden is one such example. A more recent example is Attorney General v Butterworth.23 
Here, one Greenlees, a trade federation official, gave evidence to the Restrictive Practices 
Court (RPC) to the effect that a trade agreement made by the Federation was harmful to the 
public interest. The Court declared the agreement void, and afterwards, members of the 
Federation called on Greenlees to answer for his conduct and made various attempts to oust 
him from his posts as branch treasurer and delegate. Some, but not all, of this conduct was 
intended to punish him for testifying. The Court of Appeal found the conduct amounted to 
contempt, even though it came after the conclusion of the RPC proceedings.  
 
The underlying policy for this ruling was not only the deterrent effect on the victim,24 but more 
importantly, the chilling effect on others. As Lord Denning MR put it:  
 
If this sort of thing could be done in a single case with impunity, the news of it would 
soon get round. Witnesses in other cases would be unwilling to come forward to give 
                                                          
21 Nowadays, an employer may dismiss a worker of less than 2 years’ continuous service for no reason, but may 
encounter a number of prohibitions if it gives a reason, such as discrimination, jury service, trade union activities, 
and so on. 
22 Ibid. See also Re Martin (Peter) The Times, 23 April 1986 (QB); R v Kellet [1976] QB 372 (CA). 
23 [1963] 1 QB 696 (CA). Applied, Att-Gen v Jackson [1994] COD 171 (DC), where threatening letters sent by 
prisoner to witnesses after conviction was held to be contempt. 
24 For an instance of purely private after-the-event retribution amounting to contempt, see Chapman v Honig 
[1963] 2 QB 502 (CA). Cf Borrie and Lowe: The Law of Contempt (4th edn), para 10.13. 
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evidence, or, if they did come forward, they would hesitate to speak the truth, for fear 
of the consequences.25 
 
In a similar vein, Donovan LJ asserted that the administration of justice was ‘a continuing 
thing’, meaning: ‘It has a future as well as a present; and if somebody pollutes the stream today 
so that tomorrow's litigant will find it poisoned, does he appeal to the court in vain?’26 
In a brief concurring speech, Pearson LJ agreed that:  
 
[S]uch victimisation, because it tends to deter persons from giving evidence as 
witnesses in future proceedings... is an interference with the due administration of 
justice as a continuing process...’27 
 
Although perhaps essential to conduct where the proceedings are complete, the chilling 
principle can be detected in other forms of contempt. In Attorney General v MGN Ltd,28 a 
murder suspect under arrest was vilified by some tabloids. Speaking for the three-judge 
Administrative Court, Lord Judge, LCJ, stated, ‘At the simplest level publication of such 
material may deter or discourage witnesses from coming forward and providing information 
helpful to the suspect...’29 And in R v Socialist Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd, ex parte 
Attorney General,30 a three-judge Divisional Court held that publishing the names of blackmail 
victims in defiance of the trial judge’s direction was contempt inter alia because it would deter 
other victims from coming forward. 
                                                          
25 Ibid, 719. See Borrie and Lowe (4th edn): para 10.10, ‘Therefore, the basis of contempt in this context is that 
such conduct is likely to deter potential witnesses from giving evidence in future cases.’ 
26 Ibid, 725. 
27 Ibid, 728. 
28 [2012] 1 WLR 2408 (Admin), at [31] (Lord Judge LCJ, Thomas LJ, Owen J). 
29 Ibid, [31]. 
30 [1975] QB 637 (Lord Widgery CJ, Milmo and Ackner JJ). 
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Procedural Matters 
 
The next question is whether lower courts and tribunals, where most discrimination cases are 
tried, are recognised as courts for the purposes of contempt, and in particular, contempts 
occurring out of court. As superior courts, the High Court, Court of Appeal, and the Supreme 
Court have ‘inherent powers’31 to punish for contempt committed against their own courts, or 
the lower courts.32 The procedure betrays just what a unique creature of law that contempt 
happens to be. Cases usually come before these courts by committal, and not indictment.33 The 
cases are tried summarily without a jury, despite the risk of imprisonment and an unlimited 
fine. 
 
To a degree, the procedure, nowadays laid down by statutory instrument,34 governs these 
powers. In particular, the rules recognise the High Court’s jurisdiction over contempts made in 
relation to proceedings in an ‘inferior court’.35 An ‘inferior court’ has been defined in the House 
of Lords as a body that ‘discharges judicial rather than administrative functions and forms part 
of the judicial system of the country rather than the administration of the government’.36  
 
                                                          
31 R v Lefroy (1864) 5 B & S 299; 122 ER 842. See also Borrie and Lowe (4th edn), para 13.3); Joint Committee 
on Statutory Instruments, Eleventh Report of Session 2012-13 (2012-13, HL Paper 68, HC 135-xi) paras 1.4 < 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtstatin/68/68.pdf > accessed 8 Sept 2015. 
32 R v Parke [1903] 2 KB 432 (DC). See the discussion in Law Society v Otobo [2011] EWHC 2264 (Ch) [17], 
citing H Jacob: ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’, [1970] CLP 23, esp 28-29, 48. 
33 See Re Lonrho [1990] 2 AC 154 (HL), 177, (Lord Keith), noting that the last reported prosecution by indictment 
of a newspaper for contempt was R v Tibbits and Windust [1902] 1 KB 77, a practice ‘that ought not to be revived’. 
34 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 SI 1998/3132, Part 81, s 3.  
35 Save for Contempt in the Face. Ibid, Rules 81.12-81.14. CCA 1981, s 19, states that ‘“court” includes any 
tribunal or body exercising the judicial power of the State’, and “legal proceedings” shall be construed 
accordingly’. 
36 Att-Gen v BBC [1981] AC 301 (HL), 339H (Viscount Dilhorne); see also 360A (Lord Scarman) holding that it 
should be a body ‘exercising judicial functions [which] can be demonstrated to be part of this judicial system’. 
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It would seem unarguable that litigation under the discrimination legislation, wherever it 
occurs, is more judicial than administrative in nature. Some related examples bear this out. 
Industrial (now Employment) Tribunals37 and Mental Health Tribunals38 have been recognised 
as ‘courts’ for the purpose of contempt. For the purpose of vexatious litigant restraints,39 the 
Leasehold Valuation Court40 and Investigatory Powers Tribunal41 have been recognised as 
‘inferior courts’. On this logic, it seems certain that the Special Educational Needs and 
Disability Tribunal (SENDIST) would be included. It was stated obiter that SENDIST and 
even a Local Authority Appeal Panel (dealing with exclusions from schools) exercise ‘judicial 
responsibilities’.42 
 
Finally, contempt proceedings are normally brought by the Attorney General, although there 
are examples of individuals with sufficient interest instigating contempt proceedings with 
punishment as the goal.43 To date, no contempt proceedings have been brought in relation to a 
discrimination complaint, although, as suggested below, this could be because of a (misplaced) 
belief that all forms of victimisation are provided for comprehensively by the equality 
legislation.44 
 
 
3 Restricting the Scope of the Victimisation Provisions 
 
                                                          
37 Peach Grey v Sommers [1995] ICR 549 (DC) 557-559; see also Harris (Andrews) v Lewisham & Guy’s NHS 
Trust [2000] ICR 707 (CA), [17], [32]. 
38 Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo Newspapers [1991] 2 AC 370 (HL). 
39 Supreme Court Act 1981, s 42. 
40 Att-Gen v Singer [2012] EWHC 326 (Admin). 
41 Ewing v Security Service [2003] EWHC 2051 (QB). 
42 R (N) v London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Independent Appeal Panel [2009] ELR 268 (CA) [33]. 
43 Connolly v Dale [1996] QB 120 (QB), at 125; Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1 (HL); In Re the William Thomas 
Shipping Company [1930] 2 Ch 368 (Ch). 
44 See, ‘4 Victimisation Cases Amounting to Contempt of Court’. 
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When interpreting the victimisation provisions, rather than adopting orthodox rules of statutory 
interpretation, some cases have relied instead on principles of contempt of court. This is 
betrayed inter alia by the use of language. The statutory ‘causative’ phrase ‘by reason that’45  
was key to the decisions in two prominent cases notable for the use of the language of contempt 
to restrict the reach of the law of victimisation. In Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan,46 
a reference was refused, and in Cornelius v University College of Swansea,47 a transfer and 
grievance procedure was denied. In both cases these denials were made pending the outcome 
of discrimination proceedings. And in both cases the subsequent claim for victimisation failed. 
 
The judgments in each case relied on a distinction between the bringing, and maintaining, of 
proceedings. This is a fragile and futile distinction. The protected act in question, couched 
under section 2(1)(a) (‘bringing proceedings’) is indistinguishable from ‘maintaining’ them. In 
any case, ‘maintaining proceedings’ would just as readily fall within the protected act of section 
2(1)(c), having ‘otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act’. Thus, whether the 
proceedings were ‘brought’, or maintained, should have made no difference. But for the 
purpose of contempt, the stage of proceedings is a relevant factor.48 It will often be the case 
that as the date of a trial nears, litigant anxiety increases, and with it their vulnerability to 
pressure. If the distinction had any substance at all, it comes from the law of contempt. 
 
Moreover, in addition, the Court of Appeal in Cornelius noted that: 
 
                                                          
45 From either RRA 1976 s 2(1), or SDA 1975 s 4(1). See above, p 000. 
46 [2001] ICR 1065 (HL). 
47 [1987] IRLR 141 (CA). 
48 See e.g. Att-Gen v Times Newspapers [1974] AC 273 (HL), 302 (Lord Morris). See above, text to n 15. 
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No doubt, like most experienced administrators, they recognised the risk of acting in a 
way which might embarrass the handling or be inconsistent with the outcome of current 
proceedings. They accordingly wished to defer action until the proceedings were over.49 
 
In likening the conduct to that of ‘most experienced administrators’, the Court signalled that it 
considered the conduct to have been reasonable. The House of Lords in Khan more obviously 
expressed a similar sympathy for the employer, stating that ‘Employers, acting reasonably and 
honestly, ought to be able to take steps to preserve their position in pending proceedings,’50 and 
that the refusal was ‘a reasonable response to the need to protect the employer’s interests as a party 
to litigation.’51 
 
Bearing in mind the victimisation provision under consideration, what is revealing here is that 
this language, focussing on the reasonableness of the conduct, rather than its cause (‘by reason 
that’), is so patently out of place; but it is familiar to the law of contempt, which permits a 
certain degree of ‘reasonable’ pressure or ‘fair and temperate’ criticisms between litigants.52 
The sweeping statements were made without reference to either the statutory language or its 
purpose. Beyond crossing the relatively undemanding and straightforward threshold of less 
favourable treatment,53 the victimisation provisions at the time were not concerned with the 
gravity of the conduct. Thus, the reasonableness of the conduct was irrelevant to liability. In 
                                                          
49 Ibid, [33] (Bingham LJ, for the Court). 
50 [2001] ICR 1065 (HL), [31] (Lord Nicholls). 
51 Ibid, [59] (Lord Hoffman). 
52 See above, text to n 8. 
53 See e.g. R v Birmingham City Council, ex parte EOC [1989] AC 1155 (CA and HL) (grammar schools perceived 
as better, despite no evidence); R v Secretary of State for Education and Science, ex parte Keating, The Times 3 
Dec 1985, (single-sex school for girls treated boys less favourably); Gill v El Vino [1983] QB 425 (CA), (table 
service only in wine bar for women denied women a choice). 
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Khan itself, the refusal to provide a job reference was held to be less favourable, even though 
it would have been negative.54 
 
Subsequently, the House of Lords attempted to provide a more rational explanation for these 
decisions. In St Helens Borough Council v Derbyshire,55 the House suggested that the 
‘reasonable and honest defence’ in Khan was no more than stating that the claimant had 
suffered no ‘detriment’, as required by the employment provisions of the legislation, such as 
RRA 1976, section 4(2)(c), set out above. 
 
This switching of the ‘honest and reasonable defence’ from the element of ‘by reason that’ to 
‘detriment’ was an attempt to legitimise the discretion to assess the reasonableness of the 
conduct (or its effect), and where convenient, import principles of contempt. Apart from the 
obvious problem that the House in Khan expressly held the quite the opposite (that Khan had 
suffered a detriment)56 this explanation lacks credibility simply because being caused ‘any 
other detriment’ need not have played any part in the two cases. The provision of references, 
grievance processes, and transfers, fall quite readily under section 4(2)(b), ‘opportunities for ... 
transfer ... or to any other benefits, facilities or services...’57 and withholding them, when they 
are normally provided, was less favourable treatment. 
 
In any case, a literal reading of the statutory phrase ‘subjecting him to any other detriment’ 
suggests merely that the employer causes the worker to suffer a detriment. Thus, there are two 
considerations of relevance. First, the suffering of the claimant, and second, whether this was 
                                                          
54 [2001] ICR 1065, [28] (Lord Nicholls), [42] (Lord MacKay), [52] (Lord Hoffman), [76] (Lord Scott). Lord 
Hutton agreed with Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffman [61]. 
55 [2007] ICR 84 (HL). 
56 [2001] ICR 1065 [14] (Lord Nicholls), [53] (Lord Hoffman), [37]-[38] (Lord Mackay). Lord Hutton agreed 
with Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffman [61].  
57 In Khan, Lord Mackay alone made this point for the job reference, ibid [37]-[38]. 
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caused by the employer. As relatively innocuous conduct, such as standard reactions in defence 
to litigation, can cause considerable detriment (a frozen career), the gravity of the defendant’s 
conduct is a relatively minor, if irrelevant, consideration. (Perversely, despite endorsing the 
honest and reasonable approach, the majority suggested that the matter should be judged from 
the worker’s perspective.58) Using this element to focus of the gravity of the conduct once again 
suggests the mindset of a judge considering a case of contempt rather than statutory 
victimisation. 
 
Given the fragility of the distinction (between the bringing and existence of proceedings) and 
the misplaced reliance on the element of ‘detriment’, these decisions are better explained on 
the ‘reasonableness’ basis, which itself was informed by the law of contempt. A consideration 
of the case of Derbyshire reinforces this view. 
 
In Derbyshire, the employer wrote directly to all 510 members of staff (bypassing their trade 
union and the claimants’ solicitor) stating that should an equal pay claim, pursued by just 39 
members, succeed, the resulting cost was likely to cause redundancies. The employment 
tribunal found as fact, that the letter was ‘effectively a threat’, ‘intimidating,’ and ‘directed 
against people who were in no position to debate the accuracy of the ... pessimistic 
prognostications’. The tribunal considered that reasonable reactions could include ‘surrender 
induced by fear, fear of public odium or the reproaches of colleagues.’59 
 
As a consequence, the 39 claimants brought a separate claim of victimisation, succeeding in 
the employment tribunal and the EAT, but losing in the Court of Appeal (which followed 
Cornelius and Khan). A unanimous House of Lords restored the decision of the employment 
                                                          
58 [2007] ICR 84 (HL), [26] (Lord Hope), [66], [70] (Lord Neuberger, with whom Lord Carswell agreed). 
59 Para 4(d) of the ET Reasons, cited, [2007] ICR 84 (HL), [38]. 
  
 
16 
 
tribunal. Lord Bingham held that the tribunal was entitled to distinguish Khan because: ‘The 
contrast with the present case is striking and obvious, for the object of sending the letters was 
to put pressure on the appellants to drop their claims.’60 Lord Hope interpreted the tribunal’s 
reasoning as a finding that the employer’s conduct ‘while no doubt honest, could not be said to 
have been reasonable.’ In other words, the tribunal had applied Khan properly and was entitled 
to its finding of fact.61 Baroness Hale held that the correct test was whether the employer’s 
conduct caused the claimant a ‘detriment’. As the tribunal had addressed that question,62 its 
decision could not be disturbed.63 Lord Neuberger came to much the same conclusion,64 but 
added, in line with Lord Hope’s reasoning, that the tribunal had found the employer’s conduct 
did not satisfy the ‘honest and reasonable’ test.65 Lord Carswell agreed with Lord Neuberger.  
 
The only distinction between this case and Khan was the gravity, or ‘reasonableness’, of the 
conduct. Some of the language used betrays this, with references to public odium, pressure, 
and indeed, reasonableness. As such, the cases of Khan, Cornelius, and Derbyshire become 
indistinguishable under the law of victimisation.66 They are only distinguishable if analysed 
under the law of contempt. 
 
It is apparent that the courts considered the employers’ conduct in Cornelius and Khan to be 
‘fair and temperate’,67 and not calculated to subject the claimants to obloquy.68 It will be 
recalled that when deciding if the conduct was improper (for contempt), ‘a court should 
                                                          
60 [2007] ICR 84, [9]. 
61 Ibid, [17] and [28]. 
62 Para 4(d) of the ET Reasons, cited, ibid, [38]. 
63 Ibid, [36] and [39]. 
64 Ibid, [68] and [75]. 
65 Ibid, [74]. 
66 Save for the type of less favourable treatment, which was in Derbyshire causing a detriment, rather than the 
withholding of an ‘opportunity for a transfer’, or a ‘benefit’. 
67 Att-Gen v Times Newspapers [1974] AC 273 (HL), 297-298 (Lord Reid). 
68 Ibid, 302 (Lord Morris). 
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consider [the facts] in the light of all the surrounding circumstances...’69 An important 
circumstance in both cases was the ‘general policy’ nature of the conduct. The denials of a 
reference, transfer, or grievance procedure, were all standard responses in litigation, thus 
suggesting again, that the conduct was ‘reasonable’. This is in contrast to Derbyshire, where 
the letters were intended to pressurise the claimants into a compromise, and had more of an ad 
hoc flavour about them. Any ‘general policy defence’ has no place in the law of victimisation, 
as it would be isolating only responses to discrimination complaints, which is effectively 
identifying discrimination, and leaving the victimisation provisions redundant. The point for 
the present purpose is that if this ‘general policy’ distinction played any part in the rationes 
decidendi of these cases, it has no relationship to the victimisation provisions, but is consistent 
with the law of contempt. 
 
Another feature common to these three cases which aligns them to contempt is that they all 
involved a response to on-going litigation, rather than conduct short of litigation, such as 
reporting or complaining about discrimination.70 The significance of this feature was most 
flagrantly realised in a single case, Deer v University of Oxford.71 Here, the mishandling of a 
grievance procedure was held to cause the claimant a ‘detriment’, as she held a ‘legitimate 
sense of injustice’, even though the grievance would have failed in any case. In the same case, 
the withholding of papers pending (subsequent) litigation was held not to cause the claimant a 
detriment, as it was done on ‘reasonable’ legal advice.72 
 
                                                          
69 Att-Gen v Times Newspapers [1974] AC 273 (HL), 302 (Lord Morris). See text to n 15. 
70 See Pothecary Witham Weld v Bullimore [2010] ICR 1008 (EAT), [18]-[19], where Underhill J acknowledged 
this distinction.  
71 [2015] ICR 1213 (CA). 
72 Ibid, [48] and [52] respectively. 
  
 
18 
 
An example of just how readily courts will consider the irrelevant matter of the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s conduct arose in Nicholls v Corin Tech.73 Here, Mr Nicholls was suing his 
former employer for disability discrimination. Outside the room where the hearing had taken 
place for the day, it was alleged that the defendant (owner and director of the employer) with 
three others approached Mr Nicholls; the defendant then abused him, and threatened physical 
injury (‘I will give you a disability’) if he maintained his claim. Mr Nicholls then sued for 
victimisation. The issue was whether the conduct was related to Mr Nicholl’s prior 
employment. Underhill J correctly emphasised that the statutory formula at the time required 
that the conduct arose out of and was ‘closely connected’ to the employment relationship,74 but 
then put a gloss on this, directing that the conduct had to be ‘intended or calculated to deter Mr 
Nicholls from continuing with his proceedings’; otherwise it was open for a tribunal to find no 
liability.75 
 
Bearing in mind that the issue in this case was not the relationship of the conduct to the 
proceedings, but its relationship to his prior employment, this rider was unnecessary. At the 
time, the conduct had to be ‘by reason that’ Mr Nicholls had done a ‘protected act’ (e.g. having 
brought proceedings), and for this to bite, the conduct had to be ‘closely connected’ with the 
prior employment relationship. If the facts alleged were established, it should not matter 
whether the conduct was intended to deter Mr Nichols, punish him, done out of spite, or done 
with no apparent motive.76 In fact, one would have to concoct quite a scenario where an 
employer’s reaction to an employee’s discrimination proceedings against it was unrelated to 
the employment relationship. Even if the issue were the relationship between the conduct and 
                                                          
73 (EAT, 4 March 2008), UKEAT/0290/07/LA. 
74 DDA 1995, s 16A(3). Emphasis supplied. 
75 (EAT, 4 March 2008), UKEAT/0290/07/LA, [14]. 
76 See e.g. Nagarajan v LRT [2001] AC 502 (HL), holding that motive had no part in the victimisation provisions 
and, 512 (Lord Nicholls), 523 (Lord Steyn), overruling an obiter dictum to that effect from Aziz v Trinity Street 
Taxis [1989] QB 463 (CA) 485. 
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the proceedings, the gloss went beyond anything suggested in Khan and was unnecessary. This 
case was decided after Derbyshire, yet no attempt was made to connect the defendant’s 
conduct, or intent, to ‘causing a detriment’, or any other element of the statutory formula. The 
judge’s resort to the language of contempt of court was for no apparent reason, but the effect 
of it, once again, was to restrict the scope of the victimisation provisions.  
 
In conclusion, the attempt in Derbyshire to ‘legitimatise’ a ‘reasonableness test’ by switching 
the question to the element of detriment was misplaced as it was just one of many features of 
employment protected by the legislation, and misconceived because ‘detriment’ suggests a 
focus on the claimant’s suffering  rather than the gravity of the  defendant’s conduct. However, 
this slippage may have been endorsed, albeit inadvertently, by the amended definition of 
victimisation, provided Equality Act 2010, section 27: 
 
(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— 
(a) B does a protected act, or 
(b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. 
 
The main purpose of this revision was to remove the comparative element (less favourable 
treatment), which had caused problems, as noted above.77 This also brings the victimisation 
provisions into line with the growing number of victimisation provisions provided by Part V 
of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which cover areas such as whistle blowing, jury service, 
health and safety, Sunday working, family leave and working time rights. 
                                                          
77 See Kirby v Manpower Services Commission [1980] ICR 420 (EAT), overruled, Aziz v Trinity Street Taxis 
[1989] QB 463 (CA), noted above, p 000. The replacement of the phrase by reason that with because ought not 
to make any difference. A similar amendment was made to the definition of direct discrimination, where it was 
not intended to change the legal meaning: Explanatory Note (61). The change was intended to make the definition 
‘more accessible’ to ‘ordinary users of the Act’. 
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But the choice of wording brings problems. It is no longer necessary that the defendant treated 
the victim ‘less favourably’, but rather that the defendant subjects him to a detriment. This 
means that the element of ‘detriment’ is no longer confined to one aspect of employment, but 
can now be applied legitimately to all cases of victimisation, thus endorsing the Derbyshire 
logic. Moreover, the phrase facilitates the misconceived notion, again from Derbyshire, that 
the focus should be on the gravity, and hence the reasonableness, of the defendant’s conduct. 
 
As such, under section 27, courts could now consider the seriousness of the conduct 
irrespective of whether the conduct related to, say, ‘opportunities for transfer’ or ‘any other 
benefits’ of employment. If they conclude that pressure to compromise, or abandon, 
proceedings was ‘fair and temperate’, or that the withholding of a reference was a ‘reasonable 
response’, or that a suspension of a benefit or promotion opportunity was done upon 
‘reasonable’ legal advice, or even just part of the general policy invoked against all litigants, 
the Derbyshire logic suggests they may conclude that the claimant had suffered no ‘detriment’. 
 
Such a misconceived notion of detriment not only jars with a literal reading of the statute, it is 
also at odds with the legislative history of section 27. In its response to its Consultation, the 
Government stated: 
 
We recommended ending the need for a comparator through aligning with the approach 
in employment law because this offers a more effective, workable system – not one in 
which it would necessarily be easier to win a case, but one where attention rightly 
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focused on considering whether the ‘victim’ suffered an absolute harm, irrespective of 
how others were being treated in the same circumstances.78 
 
Subsequently, the Explanatory Notes to the Equality Bill, and the resulting Act, provided this 
example of victimisation: 
 
A woman makes a complaint of sex discrimination against her employer. As a result, 
she is denied promotion. The denial of promotion would amount to victimisation.79 
 
Assuming the ‘complaint’ amounts to proceedings, the facts of this example are on all fours 
with Cornelius, the only difference being the denial of a promotion rather than a transfer. More 
generally, it suggests that a ‘normal’, or ‘reasonable’ reaction to litigation does not necessarily 
exonerate the defendant. This is so even where the reaction is one taken against all litigants, 
whether or not they are complaining of discrimination. Of course, this is the approach of (still 
binding) EU law.80 Given the approach taken in these ‘litigation cases’, courts seem likely to 
follow the principles of contempt and a focus on the gravity of the conduct. We wait to see 
whether the courts will defer to this legislative history and EU law, or whether they continue 
to assess the ‘litigation cases’ by the standards of contempt of court. Case law suggests the 
latter will prevail. 
 
                                                          
78 Government Equalities Office, The Equality Bill – Government response to the Consultation (Cm 7454, 2008) 
para 735. See also, Department for Communities and Local Government, Discrimination Law Review. A 
Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain. A consultation paper. (June 
2007), para 161. 
79 Explanatory Notes to the Equality Bill 2008, para 105. Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010, para 106, 
and the Revised Explanatory Notes (October 2010) to the Equality 2010, para 103. 
80 Case C-185/97, Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd, [1999] ICR 100 (ECJ), [27]. 
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But there is perhaps a more serious point lurking here. One must wonder why the judges felt 
strongly enough to ignore the statutory wording, and import principles from a field of criminal 
law. The parallels with contempt are not enough to explain this, as the next discussion reveals. 
 
 
4 The Limited Reach of Victimisation - Contempt Ignored 
 
The cases above demonstrate how the principles of contempt were used to limit the reach of 
victimisation under equality law. But there are other cases where quite the opposite ought to 
have occurred, but did not. The first hint of this came in Cornelius, an example of the ‘on-off’ 
relationship with contempt occurring in a single judgment. Here, the principle of 
‘reasonableness’ was imported from contempt to justify the employer’s conduct, yet the tenet81 
that the defendant’s principal motive was subsidiary to the effect of the conduct was absent. 
Elsewhere, there is a distinct body of case law on post-employment victimisation, where the 
victimisation provisions could have been supplemented with contempt principles to achieve 
their obvious purpose. 
 
 
Post-Employment Victimisation 
 
It is not uncommon for employers to victimise ex-workers for having brought a discrimination 
claim, typically by providing no reference, or a negative reference, or even supplying 
unsolicited detrimental comments to the new employer.82 In these situations, the claim is also 
                                                          
81 Att-Gen v Newspaper Publishing (Spycatcher) [1989] 1 FSR 457 (Ch), 486. The same criticism could be levelled 
at Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan [2001] ICR 1065 (HL) (see above, p 000), and Aziz v TST [1989] 
QB 463 (CA). 
82 Metropolitan Police Service v Shoebridge [2004] ICR 1690 (EAT). 
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a thing of the past, having been won, lost, or settled out of court. As such, these scenarios 
resemble Butterworth and Rowden,83 as after-the-event contempt cases, where there is an 
interference with justice as a ‘continuing process’. However, the equality legislation on this 
issue has a rocky history. 
  
The original major discrimination statutes84 were not expressed to cover post-employment 
victimisation. As noted above, for instance, RRA 1976, section 4(2), outlawed discrimination 
and victimisation by an employer ‘in the case of a person employed by him...’. The provisions 
were gradually amended expressly to cover post-employment victimisation under the influence 
of an ECJ ruling, in Coote v Granada, on the basis that such conduct came within the purpose 
of the victimisation provisions, under the deterrent principle.85 Subsequent directives extending 
EU law beyond sex discrimination codified Granada.86  
 
Before these developments, a post-employment race discrimination case (under section 4, RRA 
1976), came to the Court of Appeal. In a decision that fed subsequent victimisation cases, in 
Adekeye v Post Office (No.2)87 the Court gave section 4 an all too predictable unambitious 
interpretation. A (black) claimant had been dismissed and brought an internal appeal seeking 
reinstatement. This was unsuccessful and the claimant alleged that the appeal process directly 
discriminated her because white workers guilty of similar misconduct were not dismissed.88 
The claim was rejected for two reasons. First, the ‘ordinary and natural’ meaning of ‘in the 
case of a person employed by him’ in section 4(2) referred only to current employees.89 
                                                          
83
 See above, p 000. 
84 i.e. SDA 1975 and RRA 1976, DDA 1995. See above, p 000. 
85 Case C-185/97, Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd, [1999] ICR 100 (ECJ), [27]. 
86 Race Directive 2000/43/EC, art 7(1); Framework Directive 2000/78/EC, art 9(1) (religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation). 
87 [1997] ICR 110 (CA). 
88 Her claim against the actual dismissal was out of time. 
89 [1997] ICR 110, 118. RRA 1976, s 4 is set out above, p 000. 
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Second, the Court rejected as ‘extraordinary’ the argument that the more broadly worded Equal 
Treatment Directive 76/207 (covering sex discrimination) could inform a broader interpretation 
of the concurrent Sex Discrimination Act 1976, which being in pari materia, compelled an 
equally broad interpretation of the RRA 1976.90 
  
Even after Granada was decided, the Court of Appeal rigidly stuck to this line. In 2002, in 
Jones v 3M Healthcare Ltd (No.2),91 it entertained four joined appeals of post-employment 
discrimination and victimisation under the similarly worded Disability Discrimination Act 
1995.92 Three of the claims involved job references. The Court of Appeal chose a somewhat 
officious distinction of Granada, confining it to sex discrimination, and was dismissive of the 
impending Directive covering disability discrimination: 
 
The regimes proposed in the Framework Directives for Equal Treatment ... augur 
legislative changes in domestic employment [law] but obviously do not impact on the 
judicial construction of the 1995 Act.93 
 
At the time, 2002, the Court of Appeal had weighty authority to adopt a different path. Ringing 
down the courts and tribunals was Lord Bingham’s then recent advice that domestic 
discrimination legislation should be afforded a purposive approach, and that for the trio of Acts 
with parallel provisions in force at the time,94 ‘it is legitimate if necessary to consider those 
Acts in resolving any issue of interpretation which may arise.’95 Thus, it could have readily 
                                                          
90 [1997] ICR 110, 119. 
91 Jones v 3M Healthcare Ltd (No.2); Bond v Hackney Citizens Advice Bureau, Angel v New Possibilities NHS 
Trust, Kirker v Ambitions Personnel (Nottinghamshire) Ltd, [2002] ICR 1124 (CA). Reversed, [2003] ICR 867 
(HL).  
92 DDA 1995, s 4(2).  
93 [2002] ICR 1124, [28]. 
94 SDA 1975, RRA 1976, and DDA 1995. 
95 Anyanwu v South Bank Student Union [2001] 1 WLR 638 (HL) [2]. 
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adopted this purposive approach with the blessing of the House of Lords. Little imagination 
was required, because the ECJ in Granada had already provided a demonstration on how to go 
about this. The situation was rescued by the House of Lords96 with a purposive approach 
adopted in deference to Granada. 
 
  
As if the legislative notion of post-employment victimisation were jinxed, the Equality Act 
2010 again omitted it from the provisions, this time, in all likelihood, because of a drafting 
error.97 Predictably perhaps, the EAT98 failed to engage the recently established Ghaidan 
approach,99 or even to consider the long-standing Inco Europe Ltd100 mechanism (permitting 
corrections to an obvious casus omissus), despite the obvious error in the legislative drafting 
and its failure to comply with EU law.101 The matter was rescued, this time by the Court of 
Appeal.102  
 
Of course, the law of contempt does not recognise the post-employment boundary in itself, 
only the sometimes coincidental post-litigation boundary, with its focus on the deterrent 
principle. In none of these victimisation cases can the principles of contempt be detected, let 
alone mentioned. Yet, the consequences of these acts of retaliation or punishment were serious 
for the victims. Although they differ from Butterworth and Rowden103 in that the retaliatory 
acts were not dismissals, they had potential to do comparable, or even more, harm. Former 
                                                          
96 Relaxion v Rhys-Harper [2003] 2 CMLR 44, which also reversed a post-employment sex discrimination case 
([2001] 2 CMLR 44 (CA)), and overruled Adekeye v Post Office (No.2) [1997] ICR 110. 
97 EA 2010, s 108. See, Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey [2014] 1 WLR 3615 (CA), [36]. 
98 Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey [2013] ICR 807, reversed [2014] 1 WLR 3615 (CA). 
99 Encapsulated in, Vodafone 2 v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] Ch 77 (CA) [38]. Permission to 
appeal refused by the Supreme Court: UKSC 2009/0162 (16 Dec 2009). < https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/pta-
0910-1002.pdf > accessed 6 April 2016. 
100 Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586 (HL). 
101 [2013] ICR 807. 
102 Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey [2014] 1 WLR 3615 (CA). 
103
 See above, p 000. 
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employees may well be able to find alternative work; but with the handicap of no reference, or 
an erroneous negative reference, they might find only lower-paid, less skilled employment, or 
no work at all. In the context of negligent misstatement, House of Lords authority is forthright 
on this matter. In Spring v Guardian Assurance, Lord Slynn said: 
 
[I]n many cases an employee will stand no chance of getting another job, let alone a 
better job, unless he is given a reference. There is at least a moral obligation on the 
employer to give it.104 
 
Lord Woolf went further and expressed the view, that in respect of some types of employment,  
 
it is necessary to imply a term into the contract that the employer would, during the 
continuance of the engagement or within a reasonable time thereafter, provide a 
reference at the request of a prospective employer which was based on facts revealed 
after making … reasonably careful enquiries ….105 
 
Further, a post-employment retaliatory act, such as derogatory comments made to the current 
employer, may lead to a dismissal.106 Such treatment of former employees, because they had 
issued discrimination proceedings, was a clear interference with the administration of justice 
as a continuing process. 
 
Given the potential serious consequences of post-employment victimisation, it is remarkable 
that the courts on found a solution under compulsion by the ECJ, rather than supplement the 
                                                          
104 [1995] 2 AC 296, 335. 
105 Ibid, 354. See also Lord Goff, at 319. 
106 Metropolitan Police Service v Shoebridge [2004] ICR 1690 (EAT). 
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legislation with the principles of contempt, as the House of Lords had done with Khan and 
Derbyshire, and the Court of Appeal in Cornelius and Deer. One distinguishing feature was 
that these after-the-event cases were not ‘litigation cases’. But this makes little difference in 
the law of contempt. The remaining distinction is that this time, it was the workers rather than 
the employers, who required the court’s sympathy. 
 
 
 
4 Victimisation Cases Amounting to Contempt of Court 
 
None of the courts involved in the post-employment cases referred the conduct to the Attorney 
General for contempt proceedings. Rowden and Butterworth suggest that serious consequences 
for someone’s career and its deterrent effect warranted this. In other fields, the courts have not 
been afraid to ‘fill the moral gaps’ of legislation by creating an offence,107 or use public policy 
to do so with the civil law.108 Here, even that would not be necessary, because, as noted above, 
contempt can be applied to new and/or novel situations without apparently widening its 
scope.109 Neglecting to refer these cases effectively condones such conduct as a ‘mere civil 
wrong’, reparable with compensation, rather than the more serious criminal interference with 
the administration of justice, which this conduct often is. 
 
                                                          
107 See e.g. Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220 (HL), Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435 (HL). 
108 See e.g. A Burrows, The relationship between common law and statute in the law of obligations (2102) LQR 
235, 248 (Part 6) and the cases cited within, including, Parry v Cleaver [1970] AC 1 (HL), Samuals v Davies 
[1943] KB 526 (CA). 
109 Att-Gen v Newspaper Publishing Plc [1988] Ch 333 (CA), 368 (Sir John Donaldson MR). See above, p 000. 
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Thus, the third and final consideration is whether defendants in many cases of victimisation 
should have been referred for contempt of court. Aside from the post-employment cases, three 
examples are considered below. 
 
The first case is Nicholls v Corin Tech,110 discussed above.111 If the accusation of a threat of 
physical injury were proven, this would be the most serious contempt of the three, warranting 
imprisonment.112 The second is St Helens MBC v Derbyshire, also discussed above.113 The 
relevant contempt here is, at common law, interfering with the administration of justice, and/or 
under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (CCA 1981), applying to publications, which include 
‘any speech, writing broadcast or other communication addressed to the public or any section 
of the public’.114 The letters sent by the employer were ‘publications’ for this purpose, while 
the 510 workers constituted the ‘section of the public’. 
 
As a matter of contempt, this case resembles Attorney General v Hislop.115 Here the satirical 
magazine Private Eye published defamatory articles about Sonia Sutcliffe (wife of the 
‘Yorkshire Ripper’) suggesting that she knew her husband was a murderer and gave the police 
false alibis. Ms Sutcliffe sued Private Eye for libel. Before the trial, Private Eye repeated the 
allegations pointing out that Ms Sutcliffe would be cross-examined on them. The Court of 
Appeal held that the articles were designed to pressurise Ms Sutcliffe to abandon her claim and 
as such they amounted to contempt at common law and under the 1981 Act. McCowan LJ 
stated that there is: 
                                                          
110 UKEAT/0290/07/LA (EAT, 4 March 2008). 
111 Text to n 77. 
112 See e.g. R v William Pittendrigh (1985) 7 Cr App R. (S) 221, ( 9 months for threatening ‘if you shit on him, 
you’ve had it’); R v Maloney (Grant) (1986) 8 Cr App R. (S) 123:‘You're in for a seeing to.’ (6 months). 
113 [2007] ICR 84 (HL). See text to n 58. 
114 CCA 1981, s 2(1). 
115 [1991] 1 QB 514 (CA). 
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[A]ll the difference in the world between a private discussion between lawyers aimed 
at bringing to Mrs Sutcliffe’s attention that she might be cross-examined about certain 
matters and holding her up to public obloquy in terms neither fair nor temperate but of 
abuse, which is what I conclude without hesitation occurred in this case.116 
 
And Nicholls LJ, observed: ‘There is an enormous difference between bringing home to an 
opponent the strength of one’s own position and the weakness of his, and vilifying him in 
public.’117  
 
The circumstances in Derbyshire and Hislop were alike in many ways. There was private 
pressure to abandon the proceedings. There was also public pressure (a fortiori on a daily basis, 
in person, from work colleagues), as well as public ‘odium’ or ‘obloquy’. The difference is that 
the letters were not misrepresentations (in the ordinary legal sense of misstatements of existing 
fact), even though the forebodings never materialised. It should be noted though, the editor’s 
belief at the time that the allegations were true was considered irrelevant to liability.118 More 
importantly, the emphasis in Hislop was not on the untruthfulness of the articles, but on their 
effect upon the claimant,119 suggesting that untruthfulness is not a necessary ingredient for 
contempt. In Hutchinson v AEU,120 the Daily Worker attacked a litigant who was seeking an 
injunction to prevent his removal as union president, stating that union members ‘will no doubt 
have no mercy upon those who seek to upset working-class decisions in the capitalist courts.’ 
                                                          
116 Ibid, 535. 
117 Ibid, 530. 
118 Ibid, 526-527 & 531. 
119 Ibid, 526. 
120 The Times 25th August, 1932 p 4. 
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Goddard J found the newspaper guilty of contempt for the pressure it placed on the litigant as 
well as possible witnesses. The attack contained no misrepresentations. 
 
In Hislop, the Court of Appeal held that as the articles were intended to dissuade Ms Sutcliffe 
from pursuing her claim, they could not have been made in good faith, and so there was guilt 
even under CCA 1981, which does not apply to ‘public interest’ articles published in good 
faith.121 The same logic applies here. The reason for the sending out the letters was to pressurise 
the claimants into abandoning their equal pay claim.  
 
The conduct in Hislop was a ‘serious contempt’.122 It was only the editor’s contrition and 
resolution not in future publish comment connected to proceedings to which Private Eye was 
a party, that persuaded the Court not to imprison the editor.123 And this, in Lord Parker’s LJ 
case, was only after ‘considerable hesitation’.124 Any conduct coming close to one of the most 
flagrant and notorious contempts of modern times must risk being in contempt of court, and 
yet, in none of the eight speeches involved was it suggested.125  
 
The third case is Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v Maxwell.126 Here, the claimant 
was a Detective Constable within Specialist Operations Counter Terrorism Command Special 
Branch of the Metropolitan Police. He is of mixed race and is gay. He had issued proceedings 
for some 120 incidents of discrimination by his employer and colleagues. In response, one 
colleague leaked details of ‘their side of the story’, ridiculing the claim, to The Sun newspaper, 
                                                          
121 CCA 1981, s 5. 
122 [1991] 1 QB 514 (CA), 539 (Parker LJ), 533 (Nicholls LJ), 536 (McCowan LJ). 
123 Ibid, 539 (Parker LJ), 533 (Nicholls LJ), 536 (McCowan LJ). The publisher and editor were each fined 
£10,0000, plus ‘considerable’ costs. 
124 Ibid 539. 
125 [2007] ICR 84 (HL), [2006] ICR 90 (CA), UKEAT/0952/03/ILB (EAT, 23 July 2004). 
126 EAT, 14 May 2013, UKEAT/0232/12/MC. 
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which in turn informed the claimant’s solicitor of its intention to publish. In the event it did not 
publish (perhaps fearing contempt proceedings).  
 
This act may have been laced with motives of punishment, revenge, and indignation. But it was 
most obviously an attempt to hold the claimant out to public obloquy, and thus dissuade him 
from persisting with the claim. It was not surprising that the employer was found liable for 
victimisation. Publicly ridiculing the victim’s claim would also seem to exceed the ‘fair and 
temperate’ thresholds required for contempt, especially given the circumstances: the employer 
knew the claimant was mentally fragile (he was off sick with stress at the time); he had already 
suffered several incidents of victimisation before he had issued the proceedings; and the 
employer was the police, lending exceptional credibility to its side of the story whilst 
correspondingly undermining his. 
 
The notable feature here is that, apart from being relayed to the claimant’s solicitor, the story 
was never published. Nonetheless, a threat to publish can amount to contempt,127 and for a few 
days at least, the claimant must have been in fear of the adverse publicity, creating a real risk 
(as opposed to a remote possibility)128 that he might abandon the claim. Even where there is no 
risk, with sufficient intent, a failed attempt to interfere with the administration of justice can 
attract guilt.129 Thus, the leak, and the newspaper’s threat to publish, each amounted to a 
                                                          
127 Re Mulock (1864) 3 Sw. & Tr. 599; 164 ER 1407. 
128 R. v. Duffy, ex p Nash [1960] 2 QB 188 (DC) 200 (Lord Parker LCJ). See also, Att-Gen v News Group 
Newspapers Plc [1989] QB 110 (QB), 125; Att-Gen v Sport Newspapers Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 1194 (QB), 1208, 
1210. 
129 See e.g.: ‘[I]f the publication created no ... risk, ... common law contempt ... could only be established if those 
responsible for the publication intended it to have consequences affecting the ... proceedings which it neither 
achieved nor was ever likely to achieve.’: Re Lonrho [1990] 2 AC 154 (HL), 213 [10] (Lord Bridge). See e.g. 
Welby v Still (1892), 66 LT 523, 8 TLR 202, excerpted in Borrie and Lowe (4th edn), para 10.7). See also, Re B 
(JA) (an Infant) [1965] Ch 1112 (Ch), 1123 (Cross J): ‘the mere fact that no harm has been done in this particular 
case is neither here nor there’. For a similar approach to intending to pervert the course of justice, see R v Vreones 
[1891] 1 QB 30 (Crown Cases Reserved). 
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contempt. Alternatively, it has been advanced, obiter, that a person can be guilty of attempted 
contempt,130 which inter alia this surely was. 
 
The reason for these oversights is difficult to fathom, especially as they were not addressed in 
the cases, even by counsel. One possibility flows from the court’s reluctance to step into an 
area of employment law covered by Parliament. This occurred (in)famously in Johnson v 
Unisys Ltd,131 where the House of Lords held that damages were not available for the manner 
of a dismissal, even though it was in breach of the contractual term of mutual trust and 
confidence. The reason, in part, was that the House did not want to ‘circumvent’132 the limited 
remedy133 provided for the statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed. If presented with the 
argument that the defendant should be referred for contempt, a court might similarly be wary 
of stepping into an area now regulated by Parliament. The cases are distinguishable though, 
because Johnson was claiming for something he would otherwise not get. In these victimisation 
cases, liability has been established, and the claimant would gain nothing (financially at least) 
if the employer were convicted of contempt. Moreover, it is not unusual for one event to lead 
to civil and criminal proceedings against the same defendant. Road traffic accidents are an 
obvious example.  
 
 
5 Conclusion 
The victimisation provisions may well be drafted too rigidly to account specifically for conduct 
defending litigation. In response, the courts have taken the rather odd position of importing 
                                                          
130 See Balogh v St Albans Crown Court [1975] QB 73 (CA), 85 (Lord Denning MR), 94 (Lawton LJ), although 
doubted by Stephenson LJ, at 87. 
131 [2003] 1 AC 518. 
132 See e.g. ibid [66] (Lord Hoffman). 
133 At the time, £11,000. It is now the lower of either £78,962 (ERA 1996, s 124 (1ZA)(a), from 6 April 2016, SI 
2016/288) or a year’s pay (by SI 2013/1949 art 2(3). 
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principles of contempt to restrict the scope of victimisation, but then thoroughly ignoring those 
principles extend its scope to fulfil its purpose. Only when compelled by EU law, did the courts 
yield on post-employment victimisation. As well as ignoring their instincts on contempt to 
progress equality law, in each and every case, the judgments failed to consider whether the 
conduct should be referred for contempt. The victimisation provisions cannot have been 
intended to provide defendants with an air-raid shelter from the criminal law. 
 
Miller and Ellis’ prediction that the law of contempt could supplement the victimisation 
provisions could not have been more wrong. Quite reverse has occurred. One can only conclude 
from this ‘on-off’ association with the law of contempt, that the judiciary (and perhaps the 
Attorney General) do not consider the proper administration of discrimination law to be as 
important as the administration of justice elsewhere.  
